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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COURTS-MARTIAL LACK JURISDICTION OVER
CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS ACCOMPANYING ARMED FORCES ABROAD
Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
On May 5, 1950, Congress approved the Uniform Code of Military
Justice which, under article 2(11), granted military courts jurisdic-
tion over "persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the
armed forces" overseas.1 By executive action this legislation became
effective on May 31, 1951.2 Shortly thereafter, the wife of an Army
colonel stationed in Japan was charged with murdering her husband,
and in England the wife of an Air Force sergeant was charged with
having feloniously caused her husband's death. These women, both
civilian dependents and not military personnel, were residing with
their husbands on United States military bases at the time of the
offenses charged. Each was tried by court-martial, found guilty of
premeditated murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Upon com-
pletion of judicial review by military authorities 3 the two convictions
were contested in the federal courts through appropriate habeas
corpus proceedings on the ground that the courts-martial lacked
jurisdiction over the persons.4 The cases subsequently were consoli-
dated and argued before the Supreme Court where the convictions
were affirmed by a determination that article 2 (11) of the UCMJ was
not unconstitutional.- After reargument the following term, however,
the Court reversed its former decision and held that these two women
could not constitutionally be tried for murder by courts-martial during
time of peace. 6
1. 64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (1952).
2. Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 FED. REG. 1303 (1951).
3. United States v. Covert, 16 C.M.R. 465 (1954), rev'd and remanded 're
defense of insanity, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 19 C.M.R. 174 (1955); United States v.
Smith, 10 C.M.R. 350, aff'd, 13 C.M.R. 307 (1953), aff'd, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17
C.M.R. 314 (1954).
4. Habeas corpus is the proper method for attacking jurisdiction of a military
tribunal in a federal court. Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2(1886) (jurisdiction of military tribunal successfully contested through habeas
corpus proceedings), with Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863)(Supreme Court cannot review military proceedings by writ of certiorari). See
also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1951) § 214(b) (finality of
court-martial prevents direct review by writ of error or appeal). The scope of
review is limited to ascertaining whether the court-martial had jurisdiction over
the person and of the offense, and whether it had power to pronounce the sentence
adjudged. Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416, 418 (1922); Grafton v. United
States, 206 U.S. 333, 347-48 (1907); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65,
82 (1857).
5. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487(1956).
6. Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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The Constitution, by article III, § 2 and the sixth amendment, as-
sures to all persons indicted in a federal court the right to trial by
airy for any crime, except cases of impeachment.7 The fifth amend-
ment, however, by specifying that "except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces" the accused shall be presented before a grand jury
for indictment,8 supplies an important qualification to this right. For,
by implication, the exception in the fifth amendment applies also to the
right of trial by jury and therefore permits trial by court-martial of
persons in the armed forces who otherwise would be amenable only to
civilian criminal courts." Hence the fifth amendment, together with
article I, § 8, cI. 14 giving Congress express power to formulate rules
and regulations for the land and naval forces,10 sanctions legislation
authorizing trial of military personnel by court-martial without in-
dictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury."
The constitutional issue that was present but avoided by the Su-
pr&me Court in its initial decision was whether Congress had authority
under article I, § 8 to subject civilian dependents accompanying our
a rmed forces overseas in time of peace to trial by court-martial.2 In-
stead the Court, citing In re Rosse' and the "Inukr" cases," reasoned
that Congress, under its power to make rules and regulations for
United States territorities,'1 could establish legislative courts for the
trial of American citizens in foreign countries, and that these courts
were not necessarily obligated to afford an accused trial by jury or
7. U.S. Coxsr. art. III, \ 2 provides: "The Trial of all Crimes except in Cases
of Impeaclnent, shall be by jury ... ." U.S. COiNST. amend. VI reads: "In all
ct huinal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
t riaT, by an impartial Jury .... .
S. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capita, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a C anld Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger...." The words
" when in actual service in time of War or public danger" refer to the clause "in
the Militia" only. Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 115 (1895); me Ex parts
Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 701 (1881).
9. Io re Waidman, 42 F.2d 239, 240-41 (D. Me. 1930) ; Whelchel v. McDonald,
:40) U.S. 122, 127 (1950) (dictum); E.x parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43 (1942) (die-
tun); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137-38 (1886) (concurring opin-
i,,n) (dlictum); accord, Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8 (1920).
10. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, el. 14 gives Congress express power 'To make Rules
fr the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.!
I. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.), 65, 78-79 (1857).
12. See Kinsella v, Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 476, 480 (1956).
1). 140 U.S. 4 3 (1891), which upheld the conviction by a consular court in
Japan of a sailor who committed murder on board an American vessel in the
Far East. The Ross case broadly asserted that the immunities granted by the
fifth and sixth amendments applied only to persons tried within this country, and
that the Constitution could have no application outside the United States. Z4. at
4t';4.
14. E.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195
US,. 1 8 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v Bidwell,
182 U.S, 244 (1901). These cases, in upholding convictions secured without trial
by jury in territorial courts, declared that only certain fundamental rights
extended to ersons within unincorporated territories of the United States,
15. U.S.  osr, art. IV, § 3.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss4/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
other protections in the Bill of Rights. It therefore affirmed the con-
victions by concluding that legislation establishing military courts for
trial of civilian dependents was a reasonable exercise of constitutional
power, considering the nexus between these dependents and the mili-
tary forces.:" Reservations and dissenting opinions filed, however,
indicated that a substantial segment of the Court questioned whether
In re Ross, the "Insular" cases, and the power of Congress to provide
rules for United States territories, had any reasonable bearing on the
constitutionality of article 2 (11) of the UCMJ.17 Undoubtedly these
reservations, together with retirement from the Court of two justices
who had voted with the majority, prompted reargument the following
term.1
8
Upon second presentment of the case, the Supreme Court reversed
its former position in a decision marked by four separate opinions,
none of which mustered a majority.19 These four opinions represented
three fundamentally different approaches to the Constitution, that in
turn resulted in three different conclusions regarding the applicability
of article 2 (11) of the UCMJ. To determine the present validity of
article 2 (11), it is necessary to examine the various approaches by
which the Court reached its different conclusions.
The major opinion, declaring that the United States could never act
against its citizens at home or abroad free of the Bill of Rights,20 de-
cided that the enumerated power authorizing Congress to "make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" could
not be enlarged by the "necessary and proper" clause to subject
civilian dependents to military law.2' Civilian dependents, it was rea-
soned, are not within the enumerated power because they are not per-
sons "in the land and naval forces" by any permissible construction of
that phrase.22 Moreover, the enumerated power cannot be extended by
the "necessary and proper" clause to include civilian dependents be-
16. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956); see 354 U.S. at 65-66 (con-
curring opinion).
17. Justice Frankfurter, filing a reservation, felt that the cases had been de-
cided hastily and without time for adequate reflection. He regarded it as signifi-
cant that the Court had failed to ground its decision upon congressional power
under article I, § 8 to regulate the land and naval forces. Kinsella v. Krueger,
351 U.S. 470, 482 (1956). The Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas
dissented, but due to lack of time in the closing term, deferred writing their
dissenting views. Id. at 485-86.
18. Those representing the majority were Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion
of the Court, and Justices Reed, Burton, Minton, and Harlan. Justice Minton
retired from the Court October 16, 1956, and Justice Reed retired on February
25, 1957.
19. Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court, and was joined by the Chief
Justice, Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan. Separate concurring opinions were
filed by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Justice Clark, joined by Justice
Burton, wrote the dissent. Justice Whittaker took no part in deliberations.
20. 354 U.S. at 5-6
21. Id. at 20-21.
22. Id. at 22-23
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cause this would encroach upon rights guaranteed in article III, § 2
and the fifth and sixth amendments, 3 e.g., trial by jury before an im-
partial judge with life tenure.2 4 Legislation that purported to place
civilians under military control was therefore an unconstitutional
usurpation of power. It was evident, however, that the major seg-
ment was also concerned about establishment of a rival system of
courts under military domination.25 Hence its concern about encroach-
ment on the Bill of Rights was not necessarily a decisive, although
certainly it was a substantial,- factor in finding an absolute proscrip-
tion against broadening the express power to include civilian de-
pendents.
Two justices by individual concurring opinions agreed with reversal
of the convictions on the narrow ground that articles 2(11) of the
UCMJ, to the extent that it subjects to military trial civilian depen-
dents who commit capital offenses while accompanying the armed
forces overseas in time of peace, could not be validly sustained.27
Rather than looking to particular sections of the Constitution as con-
trolling, viz,. absence of express power under article I, § 8 and abso-
lute proscriptions in the fifth and sixth amendments, the concurring
justices looked to the Constitution as a whole and reached their con-
clusions by a method not dissimilar to a determination under the due
process clause, viz. a process of balancing and weighing all the factors
involved.' On the one side, they found that subjection of civilian de-
pendents to military jurisdiction might be reasonably related to the
power of Congress to regulate the military forces under article I, § 8,
as broadened by the "necessary and proper" clause.29 On the other
side, however, they found (1) specific procedural guarantees in article
III, § 2 and the fifth and sixth amendments, (2) a capital offense,
which of itself demanded the maximum of available safeguards for a
criminal accused,," and (3) absence of wartime pressures. Weighing
the two sides, they concluded that in these particular circumstances
the "necessary and proper" clause could not extend the enumer-
ated power under article I, § 8 to include these particular defendants
and subject them to military law. Consequently, and to this limited
extent, they declared article 2(11) of the UCMJ unconstitutional. It
would appear that, given a close nexus between civilians and the
military establishment, jurisdiction or no jurisdiction according to
the concurring justices' analysis hinges upon the presence or absence
23. 14. at 21.
24. See id. at 37
25. Id. at 40-41
26. See id. at 39-40
27. Id. at 49, 65
28. See id. at 44, 75
29. See id. at 71-73 (Harlan).
30. See id. at 45-46, 77
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in court-martial procedure of safeguards sufficiently consonant with
concepts of fairness to permit civilians to be tried for murder during
peacetime.3 ' Stated alternatively, jurisdiction or no jurisdiction turns
upon the absence or presence of an offense of such severity that it
warrants more procedural safeguards than presently are provided by
court-martial trial.
The dissenting justices, in deciding that article 2 (11) of the UCMJ
was constitutional, pointed to historical precedent, 32 and particularly
to Madsen v. Kinsella,3 3 as authority for granting court-martial juris-
diction over civilian dependents. They confined the issue before them
strictly to the question whether article 2(11) of the UCMJ was rea-
sonably related to congressional power under article I, § 8.14 They
reasoned that, since there was a close nexus between military per-
sonnel and civilian dependents abroad 35 and since there were no prac-
tical alternatives to military trial for disciplining civilians, 5 trial by
court-martial was "the least possible power adequate to the end pro-
posed. '37 Thus, finding that expansion of the enumerated power was
both necessary and reasonable, they concluded that civilian dependents
were within the scope of congressional power under article I, § 8.
By making this determination, they were not called upon to take the
31. See id. at 47 (Frankfurter) ("The method of trial alone is in issue.").
32. The dissent referred to article of war 2(d), 39 STAT. 651 (1916), 10
U.S.C. § 1473(d) (1952) (the predecessor to articles 2(10) and 2(11) of the
UCMJ), which subjected to military jurisdiction "all retainers to the camp and
all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States with-
out the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such
retainers and persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United
States in the field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States .... " However, the cases that arose under article of war 2 (d) all
dealt with offenses committed by civilians during time of war, and military juris-
diction over civilians rested at least in part upon a valid exercise of the "war
powers" of Congress, e.g., the power to raise and support armies. See, for ex-
ample, Grewe v. France, 75 F. Su. 433, 436-37 (E.D. Wis. 1948); Ex parte
Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616, 617 (S.D. . . 1917). Case precedent, therefore, is of
limited value in deciding, under the power of Congress to regulate the land and
naval forces, the validity of applying article 2(11) of the UCMJ to civilian
dependents in time of peace. See also 354 U.S. at 33; WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS *144-47 (1886).
The only analogous case disclosed by research to arise in time of peace arid to
reach the federal courts was prosecuted not under article of war 2(d) but under
article 2(11) of the UCMJ. In r'e Varney's Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal.
1956). In this case (not cited by the dissent), the court sustained the conviction
by court-martial of a civilian employee who had committed a non-capital offense
in Japan and had sought review by habeas corpus in a federal court prior to
completion of military review.
33. 343 U.S. 341 (1952). Here the Supreme Court upheld a civilian depen-
dent's conviction secured in 1950 in a United States Court of the Allied High
Commission for Germany for the murder of her husband, an Army lieutenant,
within the United States Zone of occupied Germany. In so doing, the Court
determined that jurisdiction of court-martial over petitioner was not exclusive,
as contended by petitioner, but was concurrent with occupation courts.
34. 354 U.S. at 79-80.
35. See id. at 86.
36. Id. at 86-89.
37. Id. at 89.
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further step of considering any barrier, or any balancing effect, of
the Bill of Rights. This latter step would never be required according
to the dissent's analysis, because persons either are subject to military
.1urisdiction and are not afforded the full Bill of Rights, or they are
not subject to military jurisdiction due to lack of congressional power
under article I, § 8.
The conflicting results reached by different segments of the Court,
the fundamental differences in approach used by these segments to
arrive at their conclusions, and the absence of a majority within any
one group, promptly raise the question whether in the future civilians
accompanying our military forces abroad can be subjected to court-
martial jurisdiction during time of peace for non-capital offenses.
As previously indicated, the four members of the Court comprising
the major group found there was an absolute proscription during
peacetime against trying civilian dependents by court-martials and,
thierefore, they will not be able to differentiate between classes of
offenses without upsetting their present reasoning. The two concurring
iustices, on the other hand, expressly limited their agreement to cases
ii volving capital offenses. While this fact alone is not determinative
of how they will answer the problem of non-capital offenses should it
arise in the future, their process of balancing all factors might easily
lead them to conclude that trial by court-martial meets whatever
process is "due" a civilian committing a non-capital offense 0 The
two dissenting justices, in upholding military jurisdiction over civilian
dependents when the offense is capital, have thereby determined there
also is jurisdiction when the offense is non-capital.
Assuming that in the future the two concurring justices find that
Congress has the power to provide court-martial trial for civilians for
non-capital offenses, and thereupon vote with the present dissenters,
the outcome of any test case will hinge upon the vote of the remaining
member,4' recently appointed to the Court. Any prediction, therefore,
of how the Court will decide a non-capital case if presented is little
more than guesswork; however, an evaluation of the distinction be-
tween capital and non-capital offenses can nevertheless be undertaken.
If the question is approached by weighing such factors as the num-
ber of countries within which our armed forces serve, the number of
civilians involved, the multitude and variety of offenses committed,
and the additional expenses in providing alternatives to courts-martial
38. See text at note 23 sapra.
3q. See text at note 27 supra.
40. See 354 U.S. at 76-77, particularly Justice Harlan's statement: "I do not
concede that whatever process is 'due' an offender faced with a fine or a prison
sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital
case," Id. at 77.
41. Justice 'whittaker, who was commissioned to the Court on Mfarch 25, 1957,
took no part in determination of the principal cases. See note 19 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss4/3
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trial, against the right of civilians to all the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the Constitution, it might be easy to sustain the validity
of trial of civilians by court-martial for non-capital offenses. It is
submitted, however, that this differentiation between capital and non-
capital offenses would overlook previous historical precedent. First
of all, military jurisdiction has always been asserted over civilians
because of their status, not because of the magnitude of the crime.2
Moreover, the Bill of Rights, as contrasted to the fourteenth amend-
ment,43 has never before been interpreted as making a distinction
between capital and non-capital offenses when providing procedural
safeguards for criminal trials.44 It is believed that these legal tradi-
tions should not be lightly dismissed. Furthermore, in addition to
legal arguments, inclusion of civilian dependents within the sphere of
military jurisdiction for non-capital offenses could be the first step
toward including them within the military for capital offenses at some
later date, and ultimately could lead to increasing expansions of mili-
tary power.45 This, then, is another reason for concluding that a dis-
tinction between capital and non-capital offenses should not be read
into the Bill of Rights-that a distinction between capital and non-
capital offenses should have no validity in determining the constitu-
tionality of article 2 (11) of the UCMJ.
An additional problem in predicting article 2 (11)'s future validity
is whether persons "employed by," as contrasted to persons "accom-
panying," the armed forces abroad will be amenable to court-martial
jurisdiction during time of peace. The Covert and Krueger decisions 4"
had the limited effect of declaring article 2(11) unconstitutional as
applied to civilian dependents committing capital offenses abroad. If,
as was advocated earlier, military jurisdiction is determined by the
status of the person, it is submitted that civilian employees have
42. See article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 STAT. 109 C1950),
50 U.S.C. § 552 (1952). See also Mayhew, Peacetime Jurisdiction of Courts-
Martial Over Civilian Components of the A'rmed Forces in Foreiqn Countries:
The Toth and the Covert Decisions, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 279, 281 (1956).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides: "No State shall ... deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
44. The authority of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) and Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942), relied upon by the concurring justices to
illustrate that the Supreme Court has previously recognized such a distinction,
are cases dealing with a state's obligation under the fourteenth amendment to
afford legal counsel to a criminal accused. These cases concern themselves with
the problem of what trial procedures are necessary to satisfy general require-
ments of due process imposed upon states. They do not treat a question of Juris-
diction by considering wvhether specific constitutional proscriptions against the
federal government apply or don't apply, nor are they cited for this purpose.
At best, then, the cited authority supports the bare proposition that a distinctionbetween capital and non-capital offenses has been drawn; it does not support theidea that this distinction is proper in a federal criminal case involving right to
trial by jury.
45. See 354 U.S. at 39-40.
46. The principal cases, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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sufficient nexus with the armed forces to be distinguished from civilian
dependents, The presence of employees with the armed forces over-
seas is based on a different kind of voluntariness than that of civilian
dependents; employees freely contract with the United States Govern-
ment to acquire specific military positions, while dependents contract
marriage with an individual who may or may not then be, or who
may never be, in the armed forces; employees receive pay for their
servi(ces; they have well defined duties to perform, similar to members
of the armed forces ;-7 and, in contrast to dependents, their relation-
ship to the military is functional rather than familial. On these
grounds it does not appear unreasonable to say that civilian employees
,verseas have in effect waived, by their voluntary association with
the armed forces, any right they may have to some procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the Constitution. Finally, the few cases which
have treated the problem of military jurisdiction over civilians in
peacetime could be used to support the application of article 2(11) to
civilian cployees. ' The fact that in the principal cases the major
scgment expressly excluded from its decision civilians other than de-
pendents' suggests that civilian employees will continue to remain
subject to military law under article 2 (11).
Now that civilian dependents who commit capital offenses abroad
are no longer subject to military jurisdiction, and since this conclu-
sion of the Court may well be broadened to include all dependents
regardless of the magnitude of their offenses, it is necessary to find
alternatives to court-martial for providing for the trial of these per-
sons. There seemingly are only three methods possible: (1) trial in a
district court in the United States, (2) trial in the foreign country
by a United States court, or (3) trial in a court convened by the
foreign sovereign. Each contains inherent infirmities, so, in order to
find a suitable replacement for military trial of civilians, the strengths
and weaknesses of each method should be examined.
There is no question that Congress could, under article III, § 2,
designate an appropriate forum in this country for the trial of cases
that arise outside the continental limits of the United States." How-
ever, there is no federal common law of crimes giving federal courts
47, See Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 594, 599 (1957).
48. See United States er rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) ("the
Irwer vtanted Congress ... would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to
persons who are actually members or part of the armed forces." (Emphasis
ad )) ; Iz ro Varney's Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Cal 1956) ("An
Anei ican citizen who, like the prisoner, goes voluntarily to a foreign country
thereby surrenders, for the duration of his stay, the constitutional right to trial
Iv jIr,?' (dictum)).
S49 See 354 U.S. at 22-2,
05. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl, 3 provides. "The Trial of all Crimes ...
when not committed within any State,., shall be at such Place or Places as
the Congress may by Law have directed."
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power to punish wrongful conduct as criminal,51 and it is not certain,
although international law presents no prohibition,52 that article III,
§ 2, nor any power enumerated in the Constitution, would authorize
Congress to declare that an act committed by a United States citizen
in a foreign country is a crime cognizable by our courts. 3 Hence, al-
though the forum that Congress provided would be able to afford
civilian dependents all procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, there is some doubt whether a civilian dependent overseas
could commit a crime that would be justiciable by this court. If a
solution to this problem can be found within the framework of the
Constitution, there is the further question whether a foreign state
would agree to waive its sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction over
persons committing crimes within its boundaries54 and consent to
their removal to this country for trial. Assuming that foreign nations
would be willing to grant this concession to the United States, any
statute by Congress designed to implement a uniform policy for all
civilian dependents committing offenses overseas must necessarily be
based upon diplomatic negotiations and uniform agreement among
sixty-three different countries in which our armed forces presently
are serving." When practical considerations, i.e. difficulties in ob-
taining witnesses, depositions, and documents without availability of
compulsory process; distances between the locus of the offense and
the place of trial; and cost in time, money, manpower, and effort, to
transport all principals, witnesses, documents, and real evidence, to
this country for trial, are added to the problems already mentioned,
51. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943); United States v.
Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947).
52. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94 (1922); see The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10(1927); 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-83 (1941); cf. Black-
mer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). But cf. American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
53. Authority to specify certain conduct committed by an American civilian in
a foreign state as a crime amenable in a United States court could stem from
various sources: from the treaty-making power of Congress under article I, § 10;
from the power to regulate foreign commerce under article I, § 8, cl. 3; or from
general powers retained by the national government to protect its citizens, when
these powers are not expressly prohibited to it. See Forbes v. Scannell, 13 Cal.
243,280-83 (1859).
54. According to international law, every sovereign nation has exclusive right
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over civilians within its territory, unless it
waives this right. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136(1812). The United States has decided that this principle also applies to mem-
bers of military forces visiting at the invitation of the territorial sovereign dur-
ing peacetime. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957); Cozart v. Wilson,
236 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on cet. as moot, 352 U.S. 884 (1956).55. Figures cited by the dissent in the principal cases show that there are
sixty-three foreign nations in which United States armed forces are presently
serving. See 354 U.S. at 83. Although it would be desirable that dependents as
a class be subjected to the same type of jurisdiction, e.g., trial by a United States
court, this is not necessary, and uniform agreement among all nations concerned
need not be a condition precedent to legislation providing for jurisdiction over
civilian dependents accompanying our armed forces overseas.
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it becomes apparent that trial of civilian dependents in this country
for offenses committed abroad presents many difficulties which may
well be insurmountable.
A second possibility for exercising jurisdiction over civilian de-
pendents is establishment of United States courts in foreign countries.
Again, however, any uniform policy that might be implemented would
hinge upon securing permission of every foreign state concerned.0
Moreover, since exercise of judicial power is an act of sovereignty,
there is the gravest doubt that any nation would permit creation of
foreign courts within its territory and allow them to wield sovereign
power. An entirely separate question, even assuming these courts
could be established, is what procedural safeguards must be provided
civilian dependents to satisfy constitutional requirements, i.e. must
these courts afford civilian dependents all the rights in article III, § 2
and the fifth and sixth amendments, or may they function under lesser
requirements, similar to legislative courts previously authorized under
article IV, § 3? The conflicting results in determining the validity of
article 2(11) in the Covert and Krueger decisions57 and especially the
divergent opinions regarding applicability of In re Ross and the
" 'tr",?' cases,"5 indicate that the Court might be sharply divided
as to the type of forum that must be provided. Supposing the most
probable result, that an article III, § 2 trial with full procedural safe-
guards would be necessary, at least in capital offenses, and further
supposing for hypothesis that a federal judge with life tenure were
appointed, that some kind of grand jury were constituted, and that an
impartial jury were found," the question still remains how this court
could compel witnesses to testify, subpoena documents, and otherwise
conduct its judicial functions in another country. Then, added to all
thin foregoing problems, would be the drastic expense of creating and
maintaining these tribunals in sixty-three nations. In summary, con-
siderhig the collective difficulties inherent in establishing article III
5t;. Ibd.
57. See text at notes 19-36 supra.
58. The major segment, although not expressly overruling the Ross case,
stated that at best it rested on the "fundamental misconception" that the Consti-
tution could have no application outside the United States. See 354 U.S. at 10-12.
The "imkxr" cases were distinguished from the principal cases as having noth-
jn r to do with military trials of American citizens. Id. at 14. The concurring
tiistiees distinguished rather than criticized the Ross case, saying that it had to
be viewed in its "historical context" in order to be properly understood. The
cases were held inapplicable in the present circumstances, but still
valid a, supporting the "fundamental right" test, i.e. that some, but not neces-
sarily all, rights within the Constitution have extraterritorial application. Id
at 5,J, 5rf;, 75. The dissent adhered to its former view that Ross and "Insutar"
wvre valid precedent supporting exercise of military jurisdiction over civilian
dependents in the principal cases. See W. at 79; see also text at notes 13-14
59. The problem of empanelling an impartial jury from grolups outside the
milita) forces, i.e. from the native population, United States civilian employees,
and other civilian dependents, has no easy solution.
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courts in foreign countries, this substitute for court-martial trial
seems entirely infeasible.
The remaining suggestion is that foreign nations exercise criminal
jurisdiction over civilian dependents who accompany our servicemen
outside the United States. A question immediately presented is
whether a foreign state, which concededly has jurisdiction over crimes
committed within its borders,6 ' would assume the burden of adjudi-
cating our disciplinary problems when the offense committed affects
only the citizens or property of the United States, but is of sufficient
magnitude that it cannot be handled administratively by our military
authorities. If the crime is particularly serious or violent, such as
arson or murder, the foreign sovereign might well concern itself, but
what about offenses of negligent homicide, embezzlement of govern-
ment funds, larceny from the post-exchange, falsification of official
documents, and like offenses that civilians may commit? Further-
more, there is the question how to proceed, if at all, when the act
alleged to be unlawful according to provisions of the UCMJ is not an
offense under the laws of the foreign state.0 1 Still another problem,
assuming the foreign state could and would take jurisdiction, is what
degree of authority would it demand and would the United States be
willing to grant, to perform investigations incidental to prosecuting
offenses committed on military property occupied exclusively by
United States personnel. Finally, consideration should be given to the
disparity in the law among sixty-three different countries, particu-
larly as regards variations in procedural safeguards afforded persons
accused of a crime. If substantially equal treatment of our civilian
dependents is desired regardless of where they may be situated, the
United States may face a sizable diplomatic problem to secure essen-
tially identical concessions from each country harboring our armed
forces.61
60. See note 53 supra.
61. See 354 U.S. at 80 (dissenting opinion).
It is doubtful whether this situation would arise frequently enough, if at all,
to present a problem. The criminal codes of most civilized nations wherein our
military forces are stationed probably make the same kinds of acts unlawful that
are unlawful under United States laws. Certain acts contrary to moral stand-
ards of the United States, e.g., adultery (punishable under article 134 of the
UCMJ), might not be offenses under a foreign criminal code, but probably no
civilian dependent would ever be tried by court-martial for this type of offense
in any event. Other offenses, such as treason against the United States, falsi-
fication of official documents, or destruction of government property, conceivably
could be perpetrated by civilian dependents; however, these acts seemingly would
be infrequent, and susceptible of either being prevented altogether or punished
through administrative action by military authorities. See text infra.
62. The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Status of Forces
Agreement, presently in effect between the United States and fourteen other
member nations, requires each receiving state to assure certain procedural safe-
guards to United States citizens brought to trial in local courts. See NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L
AGREEmENTS 1792, 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. Similar provisions are contained in
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In conclusion, it can be seen that there is no ready substitute for
court-martial trial of civilian dependents overseas. At present, a ma-
jority of the Court has not yet invalidated military trial for depend-
ents charged with non-capital offenses, with the result that these
persons may still be tried by court-martial. But the possibility that
the Court may abandon the distinction between capital and non-
capital offenses in a future case should be considered in any proposal
for replacing court-martial of dependents. It would appear that the
best method for supplanting court-martial of dependents, considering
all factors previously discussed, is to have the foreign sovereign
prosecute the more serious crimes according to its own laws, and
have the United States military authorities handle lesser offenses
through administrative measures, e.g., by revoking base privileges,
placing the individual on probation, or sending home repeated of-
fenders. Since the number of dependents committing serious offenses
would probably not be very many,63 the proposed solution seems ade-
treaties between the United States and nations which are not members of NATO.
See, c.q., Administrative Agreement under Art. III of the Security Treaty Be-
tween the United States and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S. TREATIS & OTHER
INT'L AGREEMENTS 3341, 3353-56, T.I.A.S. No. 2492, as amended by Protocol,
Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1846, T.I.A.S. No.
2848. See also Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in
Japan, Feb. 19, 1954, 5 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1123, 1134-37,
T.I.A.S. No. 2995.
There is a substantial possibility that the above treaty provisions will remain
in effect, nothwithstanding that as a result of the principal cases American courts-
martial no longer have jurisdiction over civilian dependents. This would not be
true if the treaty obligations imposed upon foreign states are construed as being
contingent upon the ability of American military courts to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over civilian dependents. However, a liberal and seemingly more
reasonable construction would be that these provisions are independent promises
made by the foreign nations, guaranteeing American citizens tried in a local
forum certain procedural rights consonant with requirements of due process. If
the latter construction prevails, civilian dependents tried by foreign courts will
still be afforded the procedural safeguards outlined in the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement.
Added problems will be raised by provisions in certain treaties that give Amer-
ican courts-martial exclusive jurisdiction, rather than concurrent with the foreign
court, over United States citizens committing offenses on military property abroad
(see, e.(q., Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom of
Libya, Sept. 9, 1954, 5 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMIENTs 2449, 2463-65,
T.L'A.S. No. 3107), and by treaties that make no mention of criminal jurisdic-
tion over American citizens by the territorial sovereign nor of procedural safe-
guards to be guaranteed American citizens tried by local courts (see, e.g., Agree-
w n Bettween the United States and the Imperial Ethiopian Government, May
22, 1953, 5 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 749, 756-58, T.I.A.S. No.
2904). These problems, however, do not appear to be extraordinary nor un-
manageable. See text at note 65 infra.
63. Statistics regarding the variety and frequency of offenses committed by
different classes of dependents are not available; however, it is probably true
that as a matter of policy minor children generally have not been tried by
court-martial for offenses they commit against the UCMJ, and it is also probably
true that very few if any civilian husbands accompany their service-connected
wives overseas. Therefore, wives of United States servicemen overseas would be
the only group of dependents that need be considered when treating the problem
of finding a suitable replacement for court-martial. It is believed that this rela-
tively small number of persons, distributed over an unknown number of military
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quate both to provide a ready forum for trial of serious crimes, and
to permit our military commanders to retain general disciplinary con-
trol over lesser infractions that dependents may commit.
8 4
It would, of course, be advantageous to persons subjected to trial
by foreign courts if uniform trial procedures consonant with concepts
of due process could be secured by diplomatic negotiations and treat-
ies. In the absence of uniform agreements, some variation in the
manner of trial and procedural safeguards provided an accused is
perhaps the minimum price the United States must pay to retain its
armed forces in foreign countries. However, the treaties that have im-
plemented article 2(11) of the UCMJ provide that foreign courts
should grant our citizens rights generally consistent with due process 5
bases in sixty-three foreign nations, presents no unmanageable problem. For
example, in the seven years 1950-1956 only thirteen civilians of all classes, in-
cluding employees and dependents, were subject to indictment by Army court-
martial for the offense of murder. See 354 U.S. at 47-48 (concurring opinion).
See also the government's own figures in Supplemental Memorandum for the
United States following Reargument, pp. 9-11, Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Krueger,
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
64. A major concern of the dissenting justices was that invalidation of court-
martial for civilian dependents would prevent military commanders from exer-
cising effective disciplinary control over this group, thereby disrupting morale
and discipline throughout their commands. See 354 U.S. at 85-86.
65. The agreements between the United States and England and between the
United States and Japan that were in effect when the pricipal cases arose gave
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over American citizens stationed abroad to
United States courts-martial. See Agreement Between the United States and the
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, July 27, 1942, 57 STAT. 1193, E.A.S. 355;
Administrative Agreement Under Art. III of the Security Treaty Between the
United States and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREE-
MENTS 3341, 3353, T.I.A.S. No. 2492. Now, however, most agreements between
this country and foreign nations furnishing bases for our armed forces abroad
have provisions essentially similar to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
See North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951 4 U.S.
TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846; see also house &
Baldwin, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction under the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 29 (1957); note 62 supra. Under the
NATO Agreement the sending and receiving states share concurrent jurisdiction
over United States citizens committing offenses within the territory of the re-
ceiving state, and depending upon the circumstances, either the sending or the
receiving state has primary right to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
Whenever a receiving state exercises criminal jurisdiction over an American
citizen subject to concurrent court-martial jurisdiction, the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement requires that the accused be provided with certain procedural
safeguards, viz. the right to a speedy trial, to be informed of the charges prior
to trial, to confront all witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, to have legal counsel and a competent inter-
preter, and to communicate with a representative of his government. See North
Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S. TREATIES &
OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1792, 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. Rights not specifically
granted by the NATO Agreement include: "jury trial, bail, presumption of
innocence, public trial, and exemption from cruel and unusual punishments."
Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 9
U. FLA. L. RL-. 82, 84 (1956). However, treaties with countries other than
members of NATO often contain express provisions assuring an accused such
additional rights as: protection from self-incrimination, presumption of inno-
cence, and all rights prevailing under the constitution or laws of the receiving
state. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom
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and, considering this precedent, it is believed that mutual good faith
on the part of the United States and those nations presently playing
host to our military forces can produce results that do not conflict
with American ideas of fairness.
LABOR LAW: POLITICAL EXPENDITURES OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers,
CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957)
Defendant labor union was indicted for expending union funds to
sponsor commercial television broadcasts which were intended to in-
fluence a federal election, allegedly in violation of section 610 of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act.1 The district court dismissed the in-
dictment on the ground that the "expenditures" charged were not
within the statutory prohibition. 2 On direct appeal 3 the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the use of union dues to influence the
public at large to vote for a particular candidate or political party in
a federal election constituted an "expenditure" within the meaning
of the statute.'
of Libya, Sept. 9, 1954, 5 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 2449, 2464,
T.I.A.S. No. 3107. Conversely, treaties with some nations make no mention of
any procedural safeguards to be furnished an accused, but these same treaties
contain provisions awarding the United States exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over American citizens. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States and the
Imperial Ethiopian Government, May 22, 1953, 5 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L
AGREEMENTS 749, 756-58, T.I.A.S. No. 2964; see also note 62 supra.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952). The pertinent parts of the statute are as follows:
It is unlawflul . . . for any corporation . . . or any labor organization to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative
in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for,
or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus
held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices....
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or
expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined ... and every officer
or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who con-
sents to . .. violation of this section shall be fined . . . or imprisoned....
For purposes of this section 'labor organization' means any organization
of any kind, anany agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exist for the purpose, in whole or
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
2. United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, CIO, 138
F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
3. The United States may appeal directly from the district court to the Su-
preme Court in criminal cases which deal with the construction of a statute upon
which an indictment or information is founded. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1952), United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
4. United States v. International Union United Automobile Workers, CIO,
352 U.S. 567 (1957). The Court construed the indictment as follows: "Thus, for
our purposes, the indictment charged the appellee with having used union dues
to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate
to select certain candidates for Congress in connection with the 1954 elections."
14. at 585.
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